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The textbook approach to insurance markets 
emphasizes the role of private information about 
risk in determining who purchases insurance. In 
the classic adverse selection model of Michael 
Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz (1976), individu-
als with higher expected claims buy more insur-
ance than those with lower expected claims, who 
may be out of the market entirely. This basic 
prediction of asymmetric information models of 
a “positive correlation” between insurance cov-
erage and accident occurrence has been shown 
to be robust to a variety of extensions to the stan-
dard  framework  (Pierre-André  Chiappori  and 
Bernard Salanie 2000; Chiappori et al. 2006).
In practice, however, insurance markets differ 
substantially in whether higher-risk individuals 
or lower-risk individuals have more coverage. 
In acute health insurance markets and in annu-
ity  markets,  for  example,  the  preponderance 
of  evidence  suggests  that  higher-risk  people 
have  more  insurance,  as  the  standard  theory 
would predict. However, the opposite is true in 
life  insurance,  long-term  care  insurance,  and 
Medigap markets, which tend to exhibit either 
no selection or “advantageous selection”—those 
who have more insurance are lower risk.
1 Such 
advantageous selection has been detected even 
in cases where individuals have private infor-
mation about their risk type that is positively 
1 See,  e.g.,  Finkelstein  and  James  M.  Poterba  (2004) 
on annuities, John Cawley and Tomas Philipson (1999) on 
life insurance, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) on long-
term care insurance, Hanming Fang, Michael Keane, and 
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correlated with insurance demand (Finkelstein 
and  McGarry  2006).  Indeed,  the  discrepancy 
between theory and reality is even more striking, 
given that moral hazard would tend to increase 
the risk occurrence of those with more coverage, 
even in the absence of adverse selection.
One explanation for this puzzle is that indi-
viduals may vary in their tolerance for risk, in 
addition to their exogenous risk status. When 
individuals  are  heterogeneous  in  their  prefer-
ences as well as their risk type, the relationship 
between insurance coverage and risk occurrence 
can be of any sign (e.g., Chiappori et al. 2006). 
For example, individuals with lower tolerance 
for risk may not only demand more insurance 
but may also invest in activities that lower their 
expected claims, leading the lower risk to have 
more coverage.
 In this case, the insurance market 
may exhibit over-insurance relative to the first 
best, rather than the under-insurance of classic 
adverse selection models (David de Meza and 
David C. Webb 2001). In other situations, the 
standard adverse selection result may prevail. 
The theory is not definitive.
Empirical evidence suggests significant het-
erogeneity in preferences for insurance that is 
important for understanding insurance demand. 
Examples include automobile insurance (Alma 
Cohen and Liran Einav 2007), long-term care 
insurance  (Finkelstein  and  McGarry  2006), 
Medigap (Fang, Keane, and Silverman 2006), 
and  annuities  (Einav,  Finkelstein,  and  Paul 
Schrimpf  2007).  These  papers  raise  the  pos-
sibility  that  heterogeneity  in  preferences  may 
be  as,  or  more,  important  than  heterogeneity 
in risk in explaining insurance demand. They 
also suggest that the correlation between prefer-
ences for insurance and expected claims is not 
the same across markets. For example, in both 
annuities and auto insurance, there is evidence 
Daniel Silverman (2006) on life insurance, and Cutler and 
Richard Zeckhauser (2000) for a review of the evidence in 
health insurance. We provide a more comprehensive litera-
ture review in Cutler, Finkelstein, and McGarry (2008).
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that those with greater preferences for insurance 
have higher expected insurance claims, which 
would reinforce the standard asymmetric infor-
mation effect (Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf 
2007; Cohen and Einav 2007). In the Medigap 
market and in the long-term care insurance mar-
ket, however, those with higher preferences for 
insurance appear to have lower expected claims, 
creating  offsetting  advantageous  selection 
(Fang, Keane, and Silverman 2006; Finkelstein 
and McGarry 2006). These findings suggest that 
differences in the relationship between prefer-
ences  and  expected  claims  may  help  explain 
differences across markets in whether they are 
advantageously or adversely selected.
In this paper, we examine the relation between 
risky behaviors, insurance purchases, and risk 
occurrence in five different insurance markets: 
life insurance, acute health insurance, annuities, 
long-term care insurance, and Medicare supple-
mental insurance (Medigap).
I.  Data and Empirical Framework
Our analysis uses individual-level data from 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We use 
the original HRS cohort to examine the holding 
of term life insurance and private acute health 
insurance among people age 51 to 61 in 1992. 
We  use  a  second  HRS  cohort,  the  Asset  and 
Health Dynamics (AHEAD) sample, to examine 
Medigap  insurance,  long-term  care  insurance, 
and  annuities  among  people  age  65  to  90  in 
1995. We examine contemporaneous reports of 
medical care use, and also use the panel nature 
of these data to track mortality and nursing home 
outcomes for individuals in both cohorts through 
2002.  The  working  paper  version  (Cutler, 
Finkelstein, and McGarry 2008) contains more 
detailed  information  on  the  definitions  of  the 
variables we use, as well as summary statistics.
Our basic test is to examine how measures 
of risk tolerance are related to the occurrence 
of risk, and to whether the individual has insur-
ance. Risk tolerance is not easily measured. We 
proxy for risk tolerance using five measures of 
behaviors  that  likely  capture  individual  risk 
aversion: smoking; drinking; job-based mortal-
ity risk; receipt of preventive health care; and 
use of seat belts. While each of these variables 
will reflect factors in addition to risk tolerance, 
results that are consistent across the variables 
suggest that risk tolerance is an important part 
of their variability. We have also examined the 
relationship  between  the  behavior  measures 
and a proxy for risk aversion based on respon-
dents’ reported willingness to engage in various 
hypothetical income gambles. The two are mod-
erately related (see working paper for results), 
which is consistent with prior analyses (Robert 
Barsky et al. 1997).
Our estimating equations are of the form:
(1) 
1 11insurance2 i 5 b0 1 b1Behaviori 1 XiG 1 ei ;
(2)   
Riskoccurrencei 5 a0 1 a1Behaviori 1 XiP 1 hi,
where 1 11insurance2 i is an indicator variable for 
whether the individual has a particular type of 
insurance, Riskoccurrencei is a measure of the 
occurrence of the risk the insurance in question 
would cover, Behaviori is one of our measures of 
risk tolerance, and X represents covariates.
We use five measures of insurance holdings: 
whether the individual has term life insurance in 
1992, whether the individual has private acute 
health  insurance  in  1992  (through  either  an 
employer or the nongroup market)
2, whether the 
individual has an annuity in 1995, whether the 
individual has Medicare supplemental coverage 
in 1995 (termed “Medigap”) to cover some of 
the expenses not insured by the public Medicare 
insurance, and whether the individual has long-
term-care insurance in 1995. The corresponding 
risk occurrence measures for these five insur-
ance products are: whether the individual dies 
by 2002 (for life insurance), whether the indi-
vidual reports having entered a hospital in the 
previous two years (for acute health insurance), 
whether  the  individual  survives  to  2002  (for 
annuities), contemporaneous medical expenses 
not  covered  by  Medicare  (for  Medigap),  and 
whether the individual goes into a nursing home 
by 2002 (for long-term-care insurance).
 3
2 For our analysis of the acute health insurance market, 
we exclude individuals who report public health insurance 
coverage.
3  For  our  risk  occurrence  measure  for  Medigap,  we 
impute  medical  expenditures  not  covered  by  Medicare 
based  on  information  in  the  HRS  on  hospital  and  doc-
tor  visits,  and  the  deductible  and  coinsurance  rules  for VOL. 98 NO. 2 159 PREfERENCE HEtEROGENEItY AND INSuRANCE MARkEtS
Our behavioral measures are relatively stan-
dard. Smoking behavior is defined as current 
smoking status. Drinking is a dummy variable 
for  whether  the  individual  has  three  or  more 
drinks per day (a common measure of problem 
drinking). Job risk is defined as the mortality 
rates per 100,000 employees in the individual’s 
industry-occupation cell (for the HRS) or occu-
pation cell (for the AHEAD). We also construct 
two  measures  of  active  steps  individuals  can 
take to reduce mortality and healthy risk: the 
fraction of gender-appropriate preventive health 
activity undertaken,
4 and whether the individual 
Medicare.  The  exact  imputation  procedure  is  described 
in detail in the working paper version. Results using the 
utilization measures directly are similar (not shown). For 
our risk occurrence measure for acute health insurance, we 
use an indicator variable for whether the individual entered 
a hospital, but do not impute total spending, as it would 
require more detailed information than is available about 
medical care utilization.
4 These activities are: whether the individual had a flu 
shot; had a blood test for cholesterol; checked her breasts 
for lumps monthly; had a mammogram or breast x-ray; had 
a Pap smear; had a prostate screen. 
reports always wearing a seat belt. For our 1995 
AHEAD  sample,  we  observe  these  precau-
tionary measures contemporaneously in 1995. 
Unfortunately, for the 1992 HRS sample, these 
measures are first available in 1996; we observe 
them for people who are alive at that age.
On  average,  in  our  1992  sample  of  near-
elderly, 27 percent of people smoke, 5 percent 
have a drinking problem, and the average mor-
tality risk by industry-occupation cell is 4 fatali-
ties per 100,000 employees. The average person 
undertakes  60  percent  of  gender-appropriate 
health activities, and 80 percent report always 
wearing a seat belt. Smoking rates are substan-
tially lower (7.6 percent) in our 1995 sample of 
the elderly, reflecting the strong difference in 
mortality by smoking status at older ages, but 
the other characteristics are similar.
II.  Results
Table  1  reports  the  bivariate  relationship 
between each behavior and insurance coverage. 
Table 2 shows the analogous relationship with risk 
occurrence. For completeness and comparability 
Table 1—Relationship between Risky (or Risk-Reducing) Behavior and Insurance Coverage
Insurance product
Independent variable
Term Life
(1)
Annuity
(2)
Long-term care
(3)
Medigap
(4)
Acute health 
(5)
Mean dep var   0.50 0.07 0.10 0.65 0.84
Smoking  20.034***
(0.010)
  [11,453]
20.027***
(0.009)
  [6,420]
0.007
(0.014)
  [6,401]
20.083***
(0.022)
  [6,383]
20.084***
(0.009)
  [10,945]
Drinking 20.017
(0.021)
  [11,453]
20.013
(0.016)
  [6,393]
0.016
(0.023)
  [6,376]
20.022
(0.035)
  [6,357]
20.046***
(0.017)
  [10,945]
Job risk 20.002*
(0.001)
[10,556]
20.003***
(0.001)
  [4,878]
20.002***
(0.001)
  [4,845]
20.016***
(0.002)
  [4,852]
20.005***
(0.001)
  [10,207]
Preventive care 0.115***
(0.016)
[9,773]
0.053***
(0.010)
  [6,251]
0.082***
(0.011)
  [6,233]
0.187***
(0.020)
  [6,218]
0.220***
(0.013)
  [9,411]
Always wears seat belt 0.063***
(0.013)
  [9,805]
0.030***
(0.007)
  [6,408]
0.037***
(0.009)
  [6,390]
0.058***
(0.016)
  [6,373]
0.058***
(0.010)
  [9,488]
Notes: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (1). Binary dependent variable is given in column headings. 
Each cell reports the results from a separate regression; it reports the coefficient on right-hand-side variable listed in the first 
column. Insurance is measured in the 1992 HRS in columns 1 and 5, and in the 1995 AHEAD in columns 2, 3, and 4. All 
right-hand-side variables are measured in the year insurance is measured (1992 or 1995 as indicated) except for preventive 
health activity and seat belt use for 1992 insurance coverage where they are measured in 1996. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is in square brackets. 
*** Significant at, or below, 1 percent.
  ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent.
    * Significant at, or below, 10 percent.MAY 2008 160 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
with the existing literature, the working paper 
version also reports results in which we control 
for covariates (X) designed to capture the risk 
classification  used  by  insurers.  Conditioning 
on  the  characteristics  used  in  pricing  insur-
ance  is  crucial  for  papers  testing  the  predic-
tions of standard adverse selection models, as 
these predictions are about how people behave 
conditional on the menu of contracts they face 
(Chiappori and Salanie 2000). However, when 
examining  the  influence  of  preferences  on 
insurance  demand  and  risk  type,  the  uncon-
ditional relationships may be of greater inter-
est, since we are primarily interested in how 
preferences mediate the insurance–risk occur-
rence relationship and risk classification may be 
endogenous to preferences. In practice, the two 
sets of results are very similar.
Table 1 shows that individuals who engage 
in more risky behavior (or less risk reducing 
behavior) are systematically less likely to have 
each type of insurance. The results are remark-
ably consistent across behavior measures and 
across insurance types. They are particularly 
strong for preventive health activity, seat belt 
use, and the mortality rate of the individual’s 
industry-occupation cell. Similar patterns are 
present—but  are  somewhat  less  robust—for 
smoking and drinking. To take one example, 
people  who  always  wear  a  seat  belt  are  6.3 
percentage  points  (~13  percent)  more  likely 
to  have  life  insurance,  3.0  percentage  points 
(~43 percent) more likely to have an annuity, 
3.7 percentage points (~37 percent) more likely 
to have long-term-care insurance, and 5.8 per-
centage points (~9 percent) more likely to have 
Medigap  or  acute  health  coverage.  Each  of 
these is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level.
Table  2  examines  the  relationship  between 
risky behavior and risk occurrence. The first two 
columns examine the relationship between more 
risky (less risk reducing) behaviors and mortal-
ity in the life insurance sample (column 1) and 
in the annuity sample (column 2). Not surpris-
ingly, riskier behavior is associated with higher 
mortality, and people who undertake more pre-
ventive activities have lower mortality.
Table 2—Relationship between Risky (or Risk-Reducing) Behavior and Risky Outcomes
Risky outcome
Independent  
variable
Mortality  
(1992–2002 HRS)
(1)
Mortality  
(1995–2002  
AHEAD)
(2)
Used nursing home
(1995–2002 
AHEAD)
(3)
Medical costs that 
Medigap could cover 
(1995 AHEAD)
(4)
Entered a hospital 
in preceding two 
years? (1992 HRS)
(5)
Mean dep var 0.13 0.38 0.24 $911 0.09
Smoking 0.110***
(0.008)
[11,191]
0.098***
(0.022)
[6,455]
20.011
(0.019)
[6,217]
2103.1***
(40.2)
[6,317]
20.006
(0.006)
[11,910]
Drinking 0.083***
(0.017)
[11,191]
0.021
(0.035)
[6,428]
20.030
(0.029)
[6,193]
2112.3**
(54.5)
[6,294]
0.010
(0.013)
[11,910]
Job risk 0.004***
(0.001)
[10,295]
0.007***
(0.002)
[5,681]
20.001
(0.001)
[4,849]
9.3***
(3.6)
[4,782]
0.002***
(0.001)
[10,950]
Preventive care 20.011
(0.010)
[10,085]
20.148***
(0.020)
[6,285]
20.127***
(0.018)
[6,080]
305.1***
(36.6)
[6,168]
0.060***
(0.009)
[10,123]
Always wears  
  seat belt
20.048***
(0.008)
[10,123]
20.104***
(0.016)
[6,432]
20.053***
(0.015)
[6,203]
299.4*
(59.9)
[6,307]
20.021***
(0.008)
[10,156]
Note: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (2). Dependent variables are given in column headings. Each cell 
reports the results from a separate regression; it reports the coefficient on right-hand-side variable listed in the first column. 
All right-hand-side variables are measured in 1992 in columns 1 and 5, except for preventive health activity and seat belt use, 
which are measured in 1996; all right-hand-side variables are measured in 1995 in columns 2, 3, and 4. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is in square brackets.
*** Significant at, or below, 1 percent.
  ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent.
    * Significant at, or below, 10 percent.VOL. 98 NO. 2 161 PREfERENCE HEtEROGENEItY AND INSuRANCE MARkEtS
Column 3 examines the relationship between 
behaviors and subsequent use of nursing homes. 
Although there is no systematic relationship 
between smoking, drinking, and job-based mor-
tality  risk  and  nursing  home  use,  preventive 
health activity and seat belt use are negatively 
associated with the probability of going into a 
nursing home. Since people who use preventive 
care or wear seat belts are also more likely to 
have long-term-care insurance (Table 1), these 
patterns may help explain why the market is not, 
on net, adversely selected.
Finally, columns 4 and 5 look at the relation-
ship between the various behaviors and medical 
costs that Medigap policies would cover (col-
umn 4) and the relationship between the behav-
iors  and  hospital  use,  which  is  an  important 
component of the costs that acute private health 
insurance would cover (column 5). The results 
are mixed; some risky behaviors are correlated 
with lower medical expenditures and utilization, 
while others are correlated with higher spend-
ing. Some of these behaviors, therefore, act to 
offset  the  standard  asymmetric  information 
effects, while others serve to reinforce them.
III.  Interpretation and Conclusions
Our analysis yields two main findings. First, 
in all five markets, we find that individuals who 
engage in what are commonly thought of as risky 
behaviors (smoking, drinking, or prior employ-
ment in jobs with higher mortality rates) or who 
do not take measures to reduce risk (preven-
tive health activities or wearing a seat belt) are 
systematically less likely to hold each of these 
insurance products.
5 Second, we find that these 
same individuals tend to have higher expected 
claims  for  life  insurance  and  long-term-care 
insurance, but lower expected claims for annui-
ties; for Medigap and acute health insurance, 
there is no systematic relationship between the 
behavior measures and expected claims.
5 Here we use the term “risk” to denote the chance of 
what is generally considered to be an undesirable event for 
the individual (namely, worse health or death). Of course, 
in the context of insurance purchasing, the “risk” depends 
on what is being insured. For example, from the insurance 
company’s perspective, a high mortality individual will be 
“high risk” as a life insurance consumer but “low risk” as 
an annuity buyer. 
These results can help to explain the puzzle 
of insurance we started with: why is adverse 
selection not more common? In annuity mar-
kets, there is clear evidence of adverse selection: 
people who live longer are more likely to buy 
insurance. The standard adverse selection model 
is one explanation for this, but so is variation 
in  risk  tolerance;  people  who  have  less  risky 
behaviors live longer and are more likely to buy 
annuities. In life insurance, our results suggest 
that differential risk tolerance can help explain 
why  people  with  lower  mortality  rates  have 
more insurance. Similarly, in the case of long-
term-care insurance, people who use more pre-
ventive care or are more likely to wear seat belts 
buy insurance more readily, but also stay out of 
nursing homes. For acute health insurance, the 
lack of any systematic offsetting effect of risk 
tolerance may explain why the preponderance 
of studies have found that this market is, on net, 
adversely selected. In the case of Medigap, other 
sources of advantageous selection than risk tol-
erance appear to be necessary to understand why 
this market is, on net, advantageously selected; 
indeed,  Fang,  Keane,  and  Silverman  (2006) 
have  documented  that  those  with  higher  cog-
nitive ability are more likely both to purchase 
Medigap and to have lower expected claims.
Overall,  our  findings  suggest  that  prefer-
ences for insurance—and their impact on risk 
occurrence  and  insurance  purchase—may 
help explain the different patterns of selection 
observed in different insurance markets. These 
preference effects thus provide a potential uni-
fying explanation for the differential patterns in 
insurance coverage across different markets.
Our results have a number of implications. 
Most importantly, they suggest that in consider-
ing the nature of market inefficiencies created 
by  private  information  in  insurance  markets, 
the possibility of over-insurance from advanta-
geous selection should be considered in addition 
to the under-insurance concern of classic, unidi-
mensional adverse selection models. The impli-
cations of this for welfare have received some 
attention (de Meza and Webb 2001) and are a 
fruitful subject for future research.
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